By extending the history of political prisoners to all Gulag detainees, historians have overlooked one of the most striking features of Stalin's prison camp system-namely, the revolving door, the circular movement of millions of Soviet citizens to the Gulag and back. Stalin's labor camps and colonies formed a dynamic, variable, and unstable system in which prisoners came and went in vast numbers. Ordinary peasants and workers, sentenced for minor infractions, passed through this notorious penal system in very large numbers. The Gulag and non-Gulag worlds were profoundly connected as millions not only entered the system, but returned to Soviet life. Stalin's 1945 amnesty is hardly mentioned in the scholarly literature, although it freed over half a million people and represented Stalin's largest single release of Gulag prisoners. As such, it offers the most striking example of the Gulag's revolving door.
Introduction
It was the spring of 1945 that inspired Solzhenitsyn to describe the immense expectation of amnesty among Gulag prisoners. Inmates as well as interrogators in Stalin's labor camps and colonies seemed certain that a large-scale amnesty would follow the Soviet defeat over Nazi Germany. "It just couldn't be that so many people were to remain in prison after the greatest victory in the world!" 2 Rumors of an impending release circulated widely and feverishly, according to Solzhenitsyn.
One prisoner even insisted that Stalin told an American correspondent how "after the war there would be an amnesty the like of which the world had never seen." 3 The writer who introduced the world to the Soviet Gulag characterized prisoners' hopes for amnesty at the end of WWII as completely naïve; indeed, eight years were added to Solzhenitsyn's own sentence on the very day that the amnesty was issued in July 1945. 4 However, if that day proved no different (or worse) for political offenders, this was not the case for many others. In fact, at the conclusion of Russia's most catastrophic war, over a million people had their Gulag sentences either significantly reduced or completely erased. 3 Ibid., p. 271. 4 Ibid., p. 278.
Solzhenitsyn described the 1945 amnesty as "Stalin's cruel joke with the politicals," but the law was a serious matter for many others. 5 The impact of Stalin's amnesty was enormous, but Solzhenitsyn's dismal view of the law illustrates the degree to which political and non-political detainees received different treatment within the Gulag system. If release from the Gulag remained a distant dream for political detainees and others classified as socially dangerous elements, this was not the case for ordinary criminal offenders who constituted the majority of Gulag prisoners. Indeed, roughly 20-40 percent of inmates in Stalin's labor camps and colonies were released each year from 1934 to 1953. 6 New data indicates that nearly six million prisoners were officially released under Stalin. 7 Moreover, in almost all the years of its existence, the Soviet Gulag detained a majority of criminal and not political offenders, although the proportion of "politicals" increased in the postwar years. 8 For example, in 1951, one of the peak years for the penal system in terms of the number of detainees, the Gulag held over 57,000 more prisoners for violating the June 4, 1947 law on theft of socialist property than for all counterrevolutionary offenses. 9 Illiterate, semiliterate, and persons with only an elementary school education 3 constituted the vast majority of Gulag prisoners-as many as 80% before the war. 10 This majority of camp inmates apparently lacked any eloquent memoirists and thus has remained largely obscure. Yet their experience of the Gulag is especially significant because it returned with them to Soviet society.
Over the years, knowledge of Stalin's immense labor camp system has derived largely from the testimonies and experiences of those condemned as enemies of the state, people like Solzhenitsyn,
Varlam Shamov, Eugenia Ginzburg, and Anna Larina. They and others like them spent decades in remote camps, saved only by the death of Stalin and the rehabilitation of many political prisoners in the 1950s. Their vivid memoirs convey three striking characteristics of the Soviet penal camp system: the interminable sentences attached to Gulag prisoners, the absence of any hope of release, and the complete isolation from the outside world. However, by extending the history of political prisoners to all Gulag detainees, historians have overlooked one of the most striking features of Stalin's prison camp systemnamely, the revolving door, the circular movement of millions of Soviet citizens to the Gulag and back. 11 Stalin's labor camps and colonies formed a dynamic, variable, and unstable system in which prisoners came and went in vast numbers. The Gulag and non-Gulag worlds were profoundly connected as millions not only entered the system, but left and returned to Soviet life. Stalin's amnesty is hardly mentioned in the scholarly literature, although it freed over half a million people and represented Stalin's largest single release of Gulag prisoners. 12 As such, it offers the most striking example of the Gulag's revolving door. 10 Zemskov, "Gulag," no. 6, p. 18. For this reason, Gulag prisoners had reason to expect that an amnesty might follow the victory over Nazi Germany. A month after the war's conclusion was celebrated in the Soviet Union, on July 7, 1945, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree: "On Amnesty in connection with the victory over Hitler's Germany."
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A large release of inmates might not have come as a great surprise, but the magnitude of the release and the speed with which it was carried out were unprecedented. Shortly after the Nazi invasion in 1941, over half a million prisoners were granted early release in the summer and fall of that year, and enlisted into the ranks of the Red Army. 14 Yet this enormous flow of people from the Gulag to the military in a few short months did not match the scale of the exodus that took place in a similarly short period of time just four years later. In the summer and fall of 1945, a staggering 40% turnover of the entire prison labor population took place.
According to the amnesty law, several categories of prisoners were to be released from their sentences entirely. 15 First, those punished with a term of deprivation of freedom for three years or less were subject to release. Also released were persons sentenced for wartime offenses, namely, according to In addition to granting many prisoners immediate release, the amnesty law also accelerated the release of prisoners who had been serving longer sentences. 19 The law stipulated that those sentenced to deprivation of freedom for a term of over three years could have the remainder of their unserved sentence cut in half. For example, a man sentenced to seven years deprivation of freedom in 1941 had two years, eight months, and ten days remaining on his term when the amnesty law was published. Therefore, the head of his camp's Department for the Registration and Assignment of Prisoners (otdel ucheta i 6 raspredeleniia zaliuchennyh) or OURZ recalculated the prisoner's date of release after precisely cutting the remaining sentence by exactly one-half--to one year, four months, and five days. 20 The amnesty freed some prisoners immediately, but it also accelerated the release of many others.
In a number of Gulag memoirs, criminal offenders are depicted as favored detainees who experienced far better conditions in the camps than did the political prisoners. For example, Shalamov describes how "repeating offenders were always considered 'friends of the people' right up to Lavrenty
Beria's famous amnesty of 1953." 21 In fact, Stalin's amnesty explicitly excluded recidivists. The amnesty was not extended to recidivists convicted (two or more times) for embezzlement, theft, robbery, hooliganism, and such "analogous crimes" as banditism and stealing which were punished under Stalin's draconian law of August 7, 1932 regarding the theft of socialist property.
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Moreover, persons who committed crimes that the government considered the most severe could not have the remaining portion of their sentence reduced by one-half. These included persons convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes, theft of socialist property under the law of August 7, 1932, banditism, producing counterfeit currency (fal'shivomonetnichestvo), murder, and robbery. Simply, the amnesty extended to all prisoners except for those the party considered to be the most dangerous.
In the Soviet Union, amnesty did not result solely in the blanket release of prisoners. Release from detention was just one of the benefits extended under an amnesty law. The 1945 law freed many criminals from labor camps and colonies, but it also reduced certain sentences by one-half. In addition, 
The Revolving Door
The party leadership demanded that the amnesty be executed quickly, so Gulag officials released prisoners with a great sense of urgency. Over 91,000 people who were either convicted of crimes or under investigation had been released from NKVD-UNKVD prisons across the Soviet Union in just the three-week period from July 10 to August 20, 1945. 23 Every five days, camps were supposed to provide a running tally on the numbers of prisoners they had released, and issue a final report on the breakdown of prisoners whose status changed under the amnesty. 24 The head of the Gulag, V.G. Nasedkin, wanted the bulk (osnovnoe chislo) of convicts who qualified for amnesty to be released no later than September 10 th .
In late August 1945, the chief of the Gulag administration issued warnings to various camps and colonies that were not freeing prisoners in a timely manner, and chastised them for "dragging out the implementation of the [amnesty] law," for their "weak execution of this work," and for "excessive delay in work on the release of persons who fall under the amnesty law." Nasedkin urged them to "speed up the tempo" and promptly free amnestied prisoners. The picture presented to the NKVD chief by Nasedkin in late August and Dobrynin in October appeared rather unproblematic, but Gulag administrators actually confronted a very different reality. In fact, problems in the implementation of the amnesty were common. "Since releases will be taking place on a mass scale," a senior official wrote, "one cannot exclude the possibility that people will be freed who do not appropriately fall under the amnesty law." 32 Indeed, some officials granted amnesty to recidivists, or to persons sentenced for murder. 33 Gulag authorities described anxious searches to hunt down a number of prisoners who had been released in error.
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Nonetheless, the amnesty ultimately resulted in reduced sentences and release from detention for nearly a million Gulag prisoners. The vast majority of prisoners who were impacted by the amnesty law were subject to immediate release. At the time the law was issued, there were 1,565,442 people being held in NKVD camps and colonies, 35 Nearly forty percent of the Gulag population was subject to immediate release following the publication of the amnesty law.
A look at who benefited from release under the amnesty reveals that roughly half had been convicted for wartime offenses. Of the 620,753 prisoners who were freed, nearly 38% were sentenced according to USSR Supreme Soviet laws that were largely published in the war years, particularly the law of December 26, 1941. 38 The second largest group of prisoners released-185,562 or nearly 30%--had committed property crimes such as theft and robbery. 39 Persons who committed military crimes constituted over 15% of the total number of prisoners released; the vast majority of these or 74% were serving time for desertion. 40 Only a small minority of released prisoners, or over 7%, had committed white-collar crimes such as abuse of power and embezzlement. Of the remaining ten percent of prisoners freed under the amnesty, many had been sentenced for such serious offenses as hooliganism, speculation, forgery, murder, banditry, and counterrevolutionary actions (including anti-Soviet agitation, aiding the enemy, and sabotage). 41 Such criminals qualified for release because the amnesty mainly targeted prisoners according to the length of their sentence rather than the crime for which they were convicted. 
Two Worlds Tied Together
The prison doors did not just open, leaving inmates to freely enter the world outside. Rather, Gulag involvement in the lives of prisoners continued after these inmates were awarded amnesty. Prison officials were required to prepare ex-prisoners for their entry into Soviet society by providing them with such things as passports, transportation, material goods and food, and medical care. Moreover, many amnestied prisoners stayed on as "free laborers" within the camp system. Far from being isolated from one another, the Gulag and non-Gulag worlds (prisoners and ex-prisoners, inmates and civilians) had many points of contact. 
The Long Arm of the Gulag
The Soviet labor camp system claimed to remake prisoners by subjecting them to the transformative effects of labor. Given the party's ideological commitment to this process of "reforging"
(perekovka), it is not surprising that camp authorities were responsible for managing their prisoners' transition back to Soviet life. 45 Camp officials did not immediately sever ties with prisoners once they determined that inmates qualified for release under the amnesty. Gulag authorities were responsible for managing the prisoner's transition to society. The long arm of the Gulag extended beyond the camps.
In order to function in the larger society, inmates released under the amnesty had to be issued passports. Working from a list provided by the administration of the particular place of detention (and assisted by workers from the camps and colonies themselves), the police processed and distributed passports to ex-convicts largely at the location of a prisoner's release. 46 On July 14, 1945, the head of the USSR NKVD main administration of police, A.G. Galkin, the assistant head of the prison administration, K.S. Zil'berman, and the Gulag's chief, Nasedkin, issued guidelines to the country's directors of police, corrective-labor camps, prisons, and corrective-labor colonies. 47 They indicated in the directive that the heads of prisons, camps, and colonies had to provide the local police (in the area where the camps were located) with an elaborate roster on their prisoners who qualified for release. In addition to the prisoner's name, these lists had to include the person's date and place of birth, nationality, and two photos; camp administrators also had to specify the article of the Criminal Code under which the prisoner was sentenced, previous convictions, as well as the job training (spetsial'nost') that the inmate received while in the prison, camp, or colony. The police were supposed to then issue a 5-year passport to the amnestied prisoner; ex-prisoners over the age of fifty-five received a passport without a year limit. The preparation of passports alone placed an enormous burden on Gulag officials. 45 On reforging, See Barnes, "Soviet Society Confined," pp. However, members of these ethnic minorities who were physically able to work were not released to settlements, but rather directed to workers colonies under the existing corrective labor camps. 49 For example, Germans, Finns, Romanians, Italians, Bulgarians, and members of other nationalities freed under the amnesty law were supposed to be directed to the nearest workers colony if they were physically fit for work. Those unable to work, the infirm, invalids, pregnant women, and women with small children were sent to their family's place of deportation or settlement (rasselenie). 50 For these Gulag prisoners,
"release" simply meant transfer within the NKVD system of detention from camps to settlements.
In addition to ethnic identity, a prisoner's new residence was determined by the inmate's criminal history, family situation, and physical condition. Prisoners were classified under several categories, each subject to different policies. For example, settlement restrictions also applied to criminal offenders. If amnestied prisoners were subject to passport restrictions because of their criminal record, then they were given exile according to articles 38 and 39 of the Regulations on Passports (Polozheniia o pasportakh). could be transferred to their former place of residence or to relatives even if the locations were identified as secret or classified (rezhimnye mestnosti). 52 Those ex-inmates who were not subject to any restrictions regarding their place of residence were supposed to be transported to their family's location. 53 If prisoners had no family or if they wanted to return to their former employers, then they were taken to the location of their original arrest. 54 According to the Gulag leadership, the issue of where to settle amnestied prisoners "had to be approached with care" in order to provide maximum assurance that the former inmates would "return to an honest life."
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One of the most difficult tasks associated with the massive release of prisoners concerned their transportation. The NKVD of the republics, krai, and oblasts were responsible for managing the movement of amnestied prisoners to their new locations. The NKVD was supposed to cover the prisoners' cost of transportation and provide medical and other assistance at transit points. 56 The Gulag also had to provide freed prisoners with a transportation ticket (proezdnyi billet) for travel to the station located nearest to the prisoner's new place of settlement.
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According to Gulag authorities, the overwhelming majority of people freed from colonies were residents of the local region (oblast'), so freed prisoners simply went home on commuter trains. Finally, officials at NKVD labor camps and colonies were supposed to provide freed prisoners material support during the transition to their new locations. Released inmates were supposed to be supplied with food provisions (prodovol'stvie) for the journey to their next residence. 65 Nasedkin, issued guidelines regarding material support for prisoners upon release. The camp or colony was supposed to supply freed prisoners with specified amounts of such items as bread, tea, sugar, meat and fish, and salt for 10-15 days as well as proper clothing as they traveled to their new place of residence. The camps and colonies were also expected to issue every prisoner a "food certificate" (prodattestat) specifying the products that the prisoner had a right to obtain and for how many days.
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Although Gulag officials were required to help ex-prisoners make the transition from the camps by providing transportation and material support, such assistance was often lacking. In places as diverse as Omsk, Sverdlovsk, Vologda, Gorky, and Iaroslavl, many amnestied prisoners were released without money or a transportation ticket to support their journey home.
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In October, Nasedkin criticized a series of "gross violations" at a corrective labor colony in the Arkhangelsk oblast. 68 He described how amnestied prisoners had been given dirty and torn clothing, and how the head of the corrective labor colony retained fifty three prisoners who had already served out their sentence and deserved to be released. Ex-prisoners were not given enough food to support them on the long journey from Arkhangelsk oblast to such far away places as Khabarovsk and Tambov. Food that was supposed to be distributed was not. Instead of bread, amnestied prisoners were given spoiled crackers (sukhari) and dried bread crumbs (sukharnye kroshki). Newly released inmates were supposed to be allotted a certain food ration to support them during the journey to their next destination after release from the labor colony, but current inmates were stealing these food rations. Nasedkin complained that the head of the Arkhangel'sk corrective-labor colony and his assistant were simply not taking charge of the amnesty process, but had instead left the responsibility of transporting and supplying amnestied prisoners to low-level employees, such as accountants and storage men, who were prisoners or ex-prisoners. 70 Nasedkin stated that those in camps and colonies who failed to implement the directive of the NKVD USSR and Gulag NKVD, namely the head and his assistant, should be brought to justice (privlech' k strogoi otvetstvennosti).
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Lacking everything from food to a railway ticket, ex-prisoners often resorted to theft. Administration for the Worker-Peasant Police (GURKM) issued a report to L.P. Beria, the NKVD chief, in which he associated the release of amnestied prisoners with a rise in crime. 74 He attributed the crime wave to the fact that prisoners had not received the necessary food and transportation documents for their journey, and they were not being transported to their new residence in an organized manner. In addition, amnestied prisoners had not received proper assistance in securing work at their new location. 73 Zubkova, p. 93. Apparently, areas that became home to ex-prisoners did witness a rise in crime. According to David Nordlander, "Magadan and other Gulag towns invariably experienced higher rates of robbery and assault per capita than most cities in the USSR up until the 1950s" as criminal offenders were released into communities across the country. Nordlander, p. 247.
All this was perceived by Nasedkin as unwarranted criticism of the Gulag, so he criticized the police organs in turn. 75 According to the Gulag chief, the police knew that the "amnesty would free over 600,000 people including a significant number of prisoners sentenced for theft, robbery, and hooliganism," people who "could again return to the path of crime" and yet the police "did not take elementary and necessary measures with their agents and operations in order to prevent the possibility of a rise in criminality."
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The Gulag was not isolated from the world outside its borders. When over half a million prisoners left the prison camp system in the summer and fall of 1945, they entered Soviet villages and cities like millions of others who were freed from labor camps in previous years. Camp officials were responsible for managing the prisoners' transition from Gulag to civilian life by providing them with passports, food, and transportation, but that transition was far from easy. Many ex-prisoners left the Gulag and brought the camps' diseases and deprivations with them. 77 Others, however, remained at their Gulag location despite their formal release.
The Co-existence of Prisoners and Ex-Prisoners
Many amnestied prisoners remained employed within the Gulag system--whether by choice or not. Some inmates stayed in their original camp jobs, for example, as miners, truckers, and railway workers except that their status changed to that of a free laborer (po volnomu naimu). 78 The reasons for their retention varied. For example, some prisoners could not be released from camps because of harsh weather conditions. In the remote regions of the Soviet Union, prisoners were not easily transported out 75 Nasedkin issued guidelines on July 28, 1945 to the heads of all the labor camps and colonies in which he described the need to inform amnestied prisoners about the incentives designed for them and their families. Prospective workers, he suggested, should be recruited through a series of perks that include: payment for family members to join the ex-prisoner at his new work location, adequate housing,
shoes and clothing at a discount, and a one-time stipend to both the worker and his family members.
86
Despite the advertisement, conditions were not always appealing for amnestied prisoners who agreed to remain. Ex-prisoners often did not receive the material support and incentives that they were promised, such as food, clothing, and housing, so many quit their camp jobs and made their way home. 
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. 98 Also by a GOKO decree issued since the publication of the amnesty law, 20,000 amnestied prisoners were retained in timber industries until October 1945. 99 The GOKO regularly issued instructions regarding the mandatory retention of ex-prisoners in important industries. However, such decrees were no longer valid if they were published before the amnesty law.
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Guidelines issued by the NKVD and the Procuracy on August 2, 1945 state that amnestied prisoners could only be retained at their jobs in camps or with other commissariats if the arrangement was the result of a "voluntary agreement." 101 However, many amnestied prisoners did not remain in their camp jobs willingly. The USSR Procuracy and the Gulag NKVD received many complaints from prisoners who were supposed to be freed under the amnesty but were not. Ex-convicts described how they were not being transported to their new place of residence but instead were tethered to their camp jobs against their will and under the status of free laborer.
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Moreover, many prisoners whose release was delayed filed complaints. In September 1945, Nasedkin urged camp heads to communicate with these amnestied prisoners so that they understood why and for how long they would continue to be detained at the camps following the formal release from their 97 Stalin's amnesty reveals a complex and dynamic picture of the Gulag system in which camp officials manage the prisoners' transition to Soviet society, prisoners and ex-prisoners labor next to one another, and material incentives are touted in an environment of deprivation and coercion. Gulag prisoners, ex-prisoners, and civilians can share the same space both within the camps and beyond. Far from being isolated from the rest of Stalinist society, the prison labor population appears in constant contact with a non-Gulag world, as prisoners come and go and as a prisoner's status changes. At the same time, Stalin's amnesty also exposes the fundamental instability of a penal system in which large numbers of prisoners regularly change their location and/or their status.
A Shock to the Gulag System
"The massive release [of prisoners] following the amnesty," wrote the deputy head of the Gulag OURZ in his final report regarding the law, "has resulted in significant changes in the quantity and quality of the prison population currently being held in corrective-labor camps and colonies." 104 The changes introduced by Stalin's amnesty negatively impacted an already inefficient labor camp system. The release of nearly half the prison labor force in a few short months affected Stalin's camp establishment in a profound way, and the instability it generated is even more striking when one considers that large releases of prisoners from the Gulag occurred regularly. At the same time, the amnesty also introduced certain changes to the Gulag labor force that endured throughout the postwar Stalin years.
Further Weakening a Crippled Institution
Stalin's amnesty did not benefit the Gulag system. The law was not designed to release weak prisoners, maintain skilled and able-bodied prisoners, and provide work incentives to inmates left behind.
To be sure, camp officials tried to use the amnesty law to encourage greater worker productivity and "labor competition" among inmates. 105 The law was announced at meetings of prisoners, published in special newspapers and bulletins, and discussed in barracks.
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The amnesty law became a tool to motivate prison laborers and to increase productivity. At one camp, Pechorlag, officials distributed 10,000 copies of the amnesty law to prisoners, conducted lectures and newspaper readings, and established worker competitions in order to increase labor productivity.
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However, the net impact of the amnesty on the overall Gulag system was negative, just as the NKVD leadership had warned it would be.
Prior to the publication of the amnesty law, Beria provided "data necessary for deciding the issue" of the amnesty, including estimations on the total impact of the law. 108 In a letter to V.M. Molotov in July, the NKVD chief expressed urgent concerns regarding the quantity and productivity of the Soviet Union's convict labor force following such a large amnesty. He estimated that the amnesty would result in the release of roughly 540,000 prisoners (far less than the number actually released), and noted the harmful effect of such a massive exodus of inmates on the overall strength of the NKVD convict labor force. Beria argued that "as a result of the amnesty, many of the most important enterprises and construction sites of the NKVD would be left without workers."
In an attempt to protect his institution, Beria insisted that "a series of measures must be taken so that labor strength is ensured in the production of gold, tin, wolfram, oil, and at other important sites."
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To this end, he demanded that: 1) the NKVD be freed from having to supply other commissariats with convict labor; 2) prisoners of war who are arriving from captivity should be directed only to NKVD labor camps from now on; 3) the volume of NKVD duties in the areas of construction and production should be reviewed and reduced, and only work that can be performed by the existing level of camp labor strength should be required of the commissariat; 4) the material position of the remaining convict population should be improved, especially in the area of food, as this will raise labor productivity.
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Party officials knew in advance that the amnesty would negatively impact the Gulag labor force because they received estimates regarding the effect of the amnesty on various sectors of the national economy. 111 In the end, almost all areas of major economic activity under the authority of the Gulag administration were severely affected by sharp declines in their prison labor force.
Anywhere from one-fifth to two-thirds of Gulag prisoners left various important economic sectors of the NKVD, such as the Main Administration for Road Construction (GUShOSDOR), the Department of Industrial Construction (Glavpromstroi), and the Main Administration of Camps for Mining and Metallurgy (GULGMP). 112 Moreover, the workers who left were not necessarily the least productive. In fact, the group described by officials as "the most physically capable of work in terms of their age" (that is, 17 to 30 year-olds) represented the largest single age-group released from camps and colonies following the amnesty. In addition to the loss of young labor, the Gulag also lost many workers with skills. Following the amnesty, the quantity of specialists and qualified workers among the prison population dropped sharply. Specifically, the number of prisoners trained as engineers fell by a third, from 6374 to 4256 people in NKVD labor camps and colonies. 113 The number of prisoners who had other special qualifications or skills (spetsial'nosti) also dropped by slightly over a third, from 7425 to 4729 prisoners after the amnesty. 114 The number of doctors declined by nearly 29%. 115 The pool of skilled prisoners who could work as builders, metal-workers, and miners, shrunk by around half following the amnesty.
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Overall, the population of qualified or skilled workers at NKVD labor camps and colonies dropped by 43%.
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Not only did the Gulag lose skilled and able-bodied workers under the amnesty, but less productive workers were not released in large numbers. One might assume that the 1945 amnesty would target women, invalids, minors, and the elderly because these groups were typically given priority for release. 118 Central authorities decreed that there should be a kind of queue for amnesty releases (ocherednost' v osvobozhdenii), and that these groups should be placed at the head of the line. In the case of women, although many were released at this time, the overall ratio of men to women in the camps did not change significantly. As compared with before the amnesty, during the period July-September, the number of men dropped by 25.8% and women by 54.2%. 120 Before the amnesty, the Gulag population consisted of 70.1% men and 29.9% women. 121 Following the amnesty's release of female prisoners, the composition of the Gulag population shifted by about ten percent to 79.2% men and 20.8% women. 122 However, although women, youths, invalids, and others received priority in release, the amnesty did not free these groups of prisoners in very large numbers.
Prison releases are often described as the Soviet leadership's attempt to save money by transferring less productive workers out of the Gulag. 123 However, the evidence suggests that invalids were not released from the Gulag in large numbers under Stalin's amnesty. The USSR Commissariat of Health (Narkomzdrav) and republic Commissariats of Social Security (Narkomsobesy) did not readily accept invalid ex-prisoners. The USSR Sovnarkom issued a decree (postanovlenie) on July 20, 1945 requiring these commissariats to accept sick and invalid amnestied prisoners from labor camps and colonies and to accommodate these ex-prisoners in local medical facilities (lechebnye uchrezhdeniia) and in homes for invalids.
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The reaction on the part of the Commissariats was to resist the influx of new patients on their already inadequate and overcrowded facilities. On August 11, 1945 , the USSR Commissar of Health, Miterev, sent a memo to the vice-chairman of the USSR Sovnarkom, Voznesenskii, on responsibility for sick prisoners who are freed under the amnesty. 125 Miterev seemed intent on emphasizing that the NKVD would continue to bear responsibility for many of these prisoners. He emphasized that the transportation of sick prisoners to hospitals or to places of residence following their recovery will be funded by the NKVD, and that sick ex-prisoners who do not have a permanent residence should be set-up in a job following their recovery by organs of the NKVD.
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However, relatively few invalid prisoners were actually transferred to the jurisdiction of the health and social security commissariats. On September 26, 1945, the head of the Gulag OURZ, Aleshinskii, issued a memo to Nasedkin in which he noted that "a very insignificant number [of sick or invalid ex-prisoners] has been transferred or will be moved to hospitals and invalid homes…"
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Following publication of the amnesty law, the Gulag NKVD issued a directive which asked all camps, colonies, and regional NKVD offices to report on the number of freed invalid prisoners who should be transferred to the commissariats of health and social security. By September, as many as sixty- November on the implementation of the amnesty, Liamin reported (quite remarkably) that the number of sick and invalid amnestied prisoners was "insignificant," and that these had all been accommodated at local institutions of the commissariat of health and the commissariats of social security.
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What accounts for the small numbers of invalids who were transferred out of the Gulag under the amnesty? It appears that invalid ex-prisoners had nowhere to go. There was no use in transferring prisoners to healthcare institutions that would not accept them. According to Aleshinskii, administrators planned to transfer their sick and invalid amnestied prisoners to already existing regional institutions of the commissariats of health and social security, but the latter hardly had the resources to care for many new patients. 131 The Sovnarkom of the republic of Tadzhikistan reported that sick and invalid amnestied prisoners who were being transferred to homes for invalids and other medical institutions "most often ask for material assistance which the republic cannot provide because of a lack of funds for this purpose."
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Similarly, the head of the Molotov oblast administration of corrective-labor camps and colonies (UITLK UNKVD) claimed that while he had 560 sick prisoners that warranted transfer to hospitals, the oblast health department could not provide in-patient care (koechnoe lechenie) for these ex-prisoners.
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Following the amnesty, the prison labor population continued to be characterized as physically weak. To be sure, food deprivation and the general hardship of the war years had a devastating effect on the labor camp population; rates of death and illness soared in these years. 134 Stalin's amnesty was not crafted in such a way as to mitigate the harmful effects of the labor losses on the Gulag economic machine. A profile of prison laborers before and after the amnesty reveals that the physical weakness of inmates remained a problem while the skill level of detainees declined.
Beria's letter to Molotov prior to the publication of the amnesty law suggests that the NKVD chief was responding to the policy rather than shaping it, and trying desperately to mitigate the harmful effects of the amnesty on his institution. What motivated Stalin to initiate the amnesty remains a mystery.
However, it seems clear that he did not design or implement the law with the goal of improving the economic productivity of the Gulag system.
The Amnesty's Enduring Changes
Stalin's amnesty introduced fundamental changes to the Gulag that characterized the Soviet prison labor system in the postwar years. Major shifts occurred with respect to the type of prisoners detained and the length of sentences. These proved to be lasting changes that persisted until the death of Stalin in 1953, when the next large amnesty reconfigured the composition of the Gulag yet again.
Following the massive release of prisoners with shorter sentences, the proportion of Gulag detainees with longer sentences increased. In July 1945, nearly half of all Gulag prisoners were serving sentences of under five years, but this segment of the prison labor population dropped to one third after the amnesty. Sentences of five to ten years remained the most common, but the number of prisoners serving terms in this category increased by nearly 9% following the amnesty--the largest single increase for any category of detainee. The number of people who were condemned to sentences of over ten years increased by 3.3%. 138 After the implementation of Stalin's amnesty, prisoners serving shorter sentences declined as a proportion of the overall Gulag population while those serving longer sentences increased.
The change is illustrated by the following: 
Length of

Conclusion
For millions of Soviet citizens, a Gulag sentence represented a one-way journey to oblivion. Yet millions more went there and came back. This revolving door of Stalin's Gulag presents historians with a number of challenges. First, it complicates the task of determining exactly how many Soviet citizens experienced Stalin's Gulag. Any single annual figure on the number of prisoners provides only a snapshot and fails to capture the presence of a revolving door. As Anne Applebaum wrote in her recent book on the Gulag: "Although arrests were constant, so too were releases... As a result, the total number of prisoners in the camps generally hovered around two million, but the total number of Soviet citizens who had some experience of the camps, as political or criminal prisoners, is far higher," perhaps in the area of 18 million.
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John Keep also notes: "The Gulag was a universe continually on the move… The official statistics do not neatly list the influx into the system (as individuals were sentenced) and the efflux through deaths, releases, and so on." 154 Given the degree of movement within the system, one can appreciate the difficulty of determining just how many prisoners were detained in the Stalin years. The numbers are important for understanding the degree to which Soviet citizens experienced Stalin's penal labor system and the impact that the Gulag system had on the larger society.
The existence of the revolving door presents other challenges as well. In particular, it requires historians to place the 1953 amnesty into a broader context. Shortly after the death of Stalin, the NKVD chief, Lavrenty Beria, initiated his famous amnesty of March 27, 1953 in which a million prisoners were released.
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In sheer numbers, this amnesty was the largest in Soviet history. However, as a percentage of the overall Gulag population, Beria's amnesty released the same proportion of Gulag prisoners as had been 153 Applebaum, p. xvii. When historians think about prisoner releases in the Soviet period, the first instance that comes to mind is the massive release of Gulag prisoners that took place in the 1950s following the death of Stalin.
Yet amnesty was not a post-Stalin phenomenon. Rather, continuous prisoner releases were a fundamental feature of the Gulag system he created. Ordinary peasants and workers, sentenced for minor infractions under Stalin's draconian labor laws or theft decrees, passed through this notorious penal system in very large numbers.
With millions of people both entering and exiting the Gulag, the Soviet labor camp system appears not isolated and removed from the broader society, but rather thoroughly tied to it. Millions of criminal detainees left the labor camp system following their release and settled in communities across Russia as ex-prisoners. The existence of the revolving door compels an examination into the ways in which Stalin's camps impacted the larger Soviet society, the degree to which ordinary citizens experienced penal labor, and the connectedness between the Gulag and non-Gulag worlds. These constitute largely unexplored issues that await future study.
